This paper presents an axiomatic characterization of di¤erence-form group contests, that is, contests fought among groups and where their probability of victory depends on the di¤erence of their e¤ec-tive e¤orts. This axiomatization rests on the property of Equalizing Consistency, stating that the di¤erence between winning probabilities in the grand contest and in the smaller contest should be identical across all participants in the smaller contest. This property overcomes some of the drawbacks of the widely-used ratio-form contest success functions. Our characterization shows that the criticisms commonlyheld against di¤erence-form contests success functions, such as lack of scale invariance and zero elasticity of augmentation, are unfounded. By clarifying the properties of this family of contest success functions, this axiomatization can help researchers to …nd the functional form better suited to their application of interest.
Introduction
Despite the relevance and ubiquity of contests in the real world, contest theory is often criticized for its great reliance on a particular construct: The Contest Success Function (Hirshleifer, 1989) . This function maps the e¤orts made by contenders into their probability of attaining victory or, alternatively, their share of the contested prize. Critics argue that the CSF is too reduced form, too much of a black-box. For instance, the widely-used Tullock CSF (Tullock, 1967; 1980) under which success in the contest depends on relative e¤orts might seem sensible. But there is no apparent reason why this functional form should govern most types of contests, from interstate wars to sport competitions. 1 Because of this, the predictions of contest theory might be seen as too reliant on very speci…c functional forms rather than on sound economic principles.
This view is somewhat unfair for two reasons: Firstly, because there are other areas of Economics where very speci…c functional forms are often assumed. Secondly, because there is an active and fruitful strand of the literature which in the last few years has provided a variety of foundations to the most frequently employed CSFs. 2 This literature has even addressed the econometric estimation of these functions. 3 As a result of these e¤orts, economists have now at their disposal a growing menu of well-founded CSFs to choose from. The next natural question is which type of CSF is better suited to each speci…c application. A systematic study of the properties of each family of CSFs can contribute to that aim.
One family of contests assumes that winning probabilities depend on the di¤erence of contenders'e¤orts. These di¤erence-form contests were introduced by Hirshleifer (1989; 1991) and explored later by Baik (1998) and Che and Gale (2000) for the case of bilateral contests. Di¤erence-form CSFs have been shown to emerge naturally in a number of settings. Gersbach and Haller (2009) show that a linear di¤erence-form CSF is the result of intrahousehold bargaining when partners must decide how much time to devote to themselves or to their partner. Corchón and Dahm (2010) microfound a di¤erence-form CSF as the result of a game where contenders are uncertain about the type of the external decider; by interpreting the CSF as a share, they also show that the di¤erence-form coincides with the claim-egalitarian bargaining solution. Corchón and Dahm (2011) obtain the di¤erence-form as the result of a problem where the contest designer is unable to commit to a speci…c CSF once contenders have already exerted their e¤orts. Skaperdas and Vaydia (2012) show that the di¤erence-form CSF can be derived in a Bayesian framework in which contenders produce evidence stochastically in order to persuade an audience of the correctness of their respective views. Finally, Polishchuk and Tonis (2013) show that a logarithmic di¤erence-form CSF results from using a mechanism design approach when contestants have private information over their valuation of victory. In summary, it is fair to conclude that di¤erence-form CSFs are by now well micro-founded. However, little is known about their actual properties and about how these di¤er from the properties of the more often used ratio-form CSFs, where winning probabilities are a function of the ratio of contenders'e¤ective e¤orts.
The present paper o¤ers the …rst axiomatic characterization of the family of di¤erence-form CSFs. This axiomatization rests on the Equalizing Consistency property which imposes the following condition. Consider a smaller contest among a subset of participants in the grand contest. Equalizing Consistency imposes that the di¤erence between winning probabilities in the grand contest and in the smaller contest should be identical across all participants in the smaller contest. Under this axiom then, disparities in winning probabilities across participants in a subcontest are smaller than in the grand contest. The Equalizing Consistency axiom di¤ers from the consistency axiom employed in all the existing characterizations of the ratio-form CSF. That axiom, which we relabel as Proportional Consistency here, is typically understood as imposing that contestants'winning probabilities in a smaller contest should be proportional to their winning probability in the big contest. We employ here an equivalent interpretation of the axiom, which is that the di¤erence between winning probabilities in the grand contest and in a smaller contest must be proportional to contestants'chances of success in the grand contest. Therefore, under Proportional Consistency, disparities in winning probabilities across participants in a smaller contest widen up compared to their winning probabilities in the grand contest.
We show that the Equalizing Consistency axiom can overcome some of the problems presented by the family of ratio-form CSFs. Our Theorem 1 shows that Equalizing Consistency, together with a number of reasonable axioms already employed in the literature, characterize a generalized version of the linear di¤erence-form CSF introduced by Che and Gale (2000) . This family of CSFs also encompass as particular cases the ones micro-founded in the aforementioned literature as well as the ones employed by Levine and Smith (1995) , Rohner (2006) , Persson (2008, 2009 ) and Gartzke and Rohner (2011) .
With our axiomatization, we help to clarify the properties that charac-terize the families of CSFs studied in the literature. Contrary to the received wisdom, we show that the di¤erence-form CSF can be scale invariant, i.e. homogeneous of degree zero (Theorem 2), and that it can have a positive elasticity of augmentation (Theorem 3). 4 These misconceptions are due to the common assumption of linear impacts, which we dispense with, and to the common usage of the term "di¤erence-form CSF" to refer to the logistic functional form introduced by Hirshleifer (1989; 1991) , under which winning probabilities are proportional to contenders'exponential e¤orts.
This paper contributes to the axiomatic work pioneered by Skaperdas (1996) and Clark and Riis (1998 Hwang (2012) axiomatized the family of CSF with constant elasticity of augmentation, which encompasses the logistic and the ratio forms as particular cases. Vesperoni (2013) and Lu and Wang (2014) axiomatized contests producing a ranking of players instead of a sole winner. Lu and Wang (2014) characterized success functions for contests with strict rankings of players, whereas Vesperoni (2013) axiomatized an alternative success function for rankings of any type. Finally, Bozbay and Vesperoni (2014) characterized a CSF for con ‡icts embedded in network architectures. Let us add that in our axiomatization we make connections with the income inequality literature, and in particular with the concept of absolute inequality introduced by Kolm (1976a,b) . The literature on inequality measurement o¤ers valuable insights on the properties of functional forms which we explicitly employ at several points of the text. 5 
Axiomatization
In order to be as general as possible, we consider a society divided in K 2 disjoint groups formed by a number n k 1 of individuals each adding up to a total of N . 6 Denote the set of groups by K: These K groups are in 4 Elasticity of augmentation was introduced by Hwang (2012) . A positive elasticity implies that the di¤erence between the winning probabilities of two contenders diminishes when their e¤orts increase whilst keeping constant the di¤erence between them. 5 In this same spirit, Chakravarty and Maharaj (2014) have recently characterized a new family of individual contests success functions which satisfy properties akin to the intermediate inequality and ordinal consistency axioms employed in the income distribution literature. 6 Individual contests are a particular case of the ones studied here. All our results, except those in Section 4, which deal with the aggregation of individual e¤orts within competition. They are engaged in a contest which can have only one winner. Members of the contender groups can expend non-negative e¤ort in order to help their group to win the contest. Depending on the speci…c type of contest, these e¤orts can be money, time, physical e¤ort or weapons. Denote by x k (x 1k ; :::; x n k k ) 2 R n k + the vector of non-negative e¤orts by members of group k and by x the vector (x 1 ; :::; x K ). For convenience we will denote by x k the vector of e¤orts in groups other than k:
E¤orts determine the winning probability of each group according to a Contest Success Function (CSF)
The function p k (x) can also be thought of as the share of the prize or object being contested that group k obtains in case of victory. We favor the former interpretation throughout the paper.
Let us now state the axioms that we would like to impose on our CSF.
Two basic axioms:
Let us …rst present two axioms introduced by Skaperdas (1996) in his axiomatization of CSFs for individual contests and later generalized by Münster (2009) for group contests. These axioms are rather natural and should thus apply to the class of di¤erence-form group contests we study in this paper.
Axiom 1 (Probability) P K k=1 p k (x) = 1 and p k (x) 0 for any x and all k 2 K:
The axiom of Probability just states that the CSF generates a probability distribution over the set of groups. The Monotonicity axiom implies that group winning probabilities are weakly increasing in the e¤ort of members and weakly decreasing in the e¤ort of outsiders. Note that this axiom is slightly weaker than the Monotonicity axiom employed in Münster (2009) and the analogous one in Rai and Sarin (2009).
Subcontest axioms:
The next two axioms relate to contests played among a generic non-empty subset S K of contender groups. We refer to this contest among groups in S as a subcontest. Let us denote by S the groups, thus apply to individual contests as well.
cardinality of subcontest S and by p S k (x) the winning probability of group k in this subcontest. In particular, denote by p fk;lg k (x) the winning probability of group k in the bilateral contest against group l: Finally, denote by x S and x S the vector of e¤orts in the groups inside and outside S respectively.
Independence implies that the e¤orts made by contenders outside a subcontest should not matter to its result. As discussed by Skaperdas (1996) and Clark and Riis (1998) , this property relates to the axiom of Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives in probabilistic individual choice. Thus, it is a reasonable property in contests where nature determines the winner. Independence also implies that there are no spillovers across subcontests or that spillovers a¤ect all contenders in S equally. 7 The next axiom is crucial in our axiomatization of the family of di¤erence-form CSFs.
Axiom 4 (Equalizing Consistency) For any vector x and any subcontest
Given any subcontest formed by groups with a positive probability of winning the grand contest, Equalizing Consistency states that the probability of group k winning that subcontest is equal to its probability of winning the grand contest plus a …xed amount. That amount is an equal proportion of the probability that no group in the subcontest wins the grand contest. In other words, suppose that a number of contenders drop out from K and that all remaining contenders had a positive probability of winning the grand contest. The axiom states that the remaining groups "share" equally the probability of any of the non participating groups winning the grand contest.
It is natural to expect that the winning probability of contenders should be higher when competing in S than when competing in K. Equalizing Consistency implies that this increase should be the same across contenders. This, of course, does not exhaust all possibilities. Interestingly, it is possible to state the main axiom characterizing the family of ratio-form CSFs in a similar way. This axiom is called simply Consistency by Skaperdas (1996) , Münster (2009) and Ray and Sarin (2009). We here rename it as Proportional Consistency in order to avoid confusion with the previous axiom.
Axiom 4'(Proportional Consistency
This axiom posits that the increase in winning probabilities that members of the subcontest experience from narrowing the contest from K to S must be proportional to their winning probability in the grand contest.
Let us now devote some time to compare the implications of these two axioms. Proportional Consistency is often invoked as a natural assumption. It implies that the relative success of two groups should be identical across subcontests, that is p
However, this property presents some drawbacks. First, it is not well de…ned when p k (x) = 0 for all contenders in S. Second, it forces contenders with zero probability in the grand contest to have a zero winning probability in any subconstest. For instance, suppose that a contender k is very weak and has a zero winning probability in the big contest, whereas group l is marginally stronger and has a winning probability " arbitrarily close to zero. Then group k must have a zero winning probability in any subcontest S, including the bilateral contest against the similarly weak group l. This might be undesirable in some contexts, as in Political Economy applications, where a party may have no chances in a general election but a large probability of winning a local one.
On the other hand, the Equalizing Consistency axiom implies that the di¤erence in winning probabilities between two groups should be identical across subcontests whose groups have positive winning probabilities in the grand contest, that is
Therefore, Equalizing Consistency does not impose anything on contenders with a zero winning probability in K. Still, we can compare both axioms when a contender has a winning probability arbitrarily close to zero. Take two contenders, one with winning probability p < 1 and a weaker one with winning probability " < p. Under Proportional Consistency, the latter would win their bilateral contest with probability " "+p ; which tends to zero as " goes to zero. Under Equalizing Consistency though, the weaker contender would win instead with probability
which tends to
The reader may argue that one drawback of the Equalizing Consistency axiom could be the following: Consider a scenario where one contender group is much weaker than the rest of groups, who are all equally strong. But because there is a large number of these strong groups, each of them enjoys a winning probability of just q" where q > 1 and " is the winning probability of the weak group. Equalizing Consistency would imply that the weak group would have a winning probability of
in a bilateral contest against one of the strong groups. This seems unrealistic since this group is substantially weaker than the other. But as we will see below, the CSF that we axiomatize here would bound to zero the winning probability of the weak contender; if this group had a positive winning probability in the grand contest then it could not be much weaker than the rest.
One last word on the comparison of these two axioms. Equalizing and Proportional Consistency are approximately equivalent when the members of the subcontest have similar winning probabilities in the grand contest, so that
2.3 The main theorem: We are now in the position to state our main theorem characterizing the family of the di¤erence-form CSFs. This family emerges from using the basic axioms of Probability, Monotonicity and Independence together with Equalizing Consistency.
Theorem 1 If the CSF p k (x) is continuous and satis…es axioms A1-A4 then for each vector x there exists an integer K K such that
where without loss of generality h k+1 (x k+1 ) h k (x k ) and where each h k : R n k + ! R is a continuous and increasing function. Proof. Take any three contender groups j; k and l with strictly positive winning probabilities in K: Then,
where the second equality comes from A3 and from the fact that A4 also applies to the bilateral contests involving the pairs of contenders fk; jg and fl; jg: By the same token, it must be that
so it is possible to rewrite the above expression as
which by A1 boils down to
Since the left hand side of the expression does not depend on x j ; the right hand side cannot depend on x j either. Therefore, we can rewrite the right hand side as the di¤erence of two functions
And by using A4 again we obtain
Note that h k : R n k + ! R must be continuous given that p k (x) and p l (x) are continuous too. Denote by K the set of contender groups who enjoy a positive winning probability in the grand contest, that is, those A4 apply to. Let K be the cardinality of this set. Adding up expression (4) across these K groups we obtain
which after noting that X l2K p l (x) = 1 leads to expression (3).
We next characterize the set K : We have established that p k can be written as a mapping from impacts into probabilities, i.e.
We can then associate a function h k : R n k + ! R to each group: Given x and without loss of generality, let us order groups in a decreasing manner such that
We shall now argue that the set K is given by the largest integer K such that
Because we ordered groups in a decreasing manner, (6) holds true for any group k = 1; :::; K : Observe that such K is unique and well-de…ned since it is straightforward to show that
By construction, (6) must hold for any contender group with p k (x) >0: We must then work out the opposite implication, that is, that if (6) holds for group k then p k (x) >0: Suppose on the contrary that p k (x) =0: Adding up (3) across all groups l from 1 to K except k yields
thus contradicting that (6) holds for k:
We must …nally prove that each function h k (x k ) is increasing. Consider a pair of vectors x 0 and x such that x 0 = (x 1 ; :::; x 0 k ; :::;
0 is identical to vector x except for group k: By A2 it must be that p k (x) p k (x 0 ) and p l (x) p l (x 0 ) for any l 6 = k: The property holds trivially if p k (x) = 0 or p l (x) = 0: If both probabilities are strictly positive, expression (4) implies that
thus proving that h k (x k ) is increasing. This …nalizes the proof.
The function h k (x k ) is commonly known as the impact function. It aggregates members'e¤orts into a measure of their group in ‡uence in the contest. Alternatively, it can be seen as the function determining how e¤ective players' e¤orts are.
The di¤erence-form group CSF in (3) relates the success of a group to the di¤erence between its impact and the average impact of all the groups involved in the contest. If the impact of a group is above (below) the average impact, its winning probability must be above (below) the winning probability that the group would be awarded under a fair lottery. If the impact of a group is positive but su¢ ciently below average impact, its winning probability is just zero. Of course, this should never happen in equilibrium if e¤orts are costly.
One immediately obvious feature of this CSF is that it is additively separable in the impact of the contestant groups. The marginal productivity of individual e¤orts does not depend on the e¤orts of outsiders. This implies that any equilibrium in an individual contest under this CSF must be in dominant strategies.
The di¤erence-form CSF also allows contenders to attain a sure victory if their impact is su¢ ciently large. Take for instance, the case of two-group contests, i.e. K = 2; where (3) boils down to
This CSF generalizes the linear di¤erence-form CSF for two-player contests introduced by Che and Gale (2000) and later employed by Rohner 
This shows that, as highlighted by Che and Gale (2000) , the di¤erence-form CSF has strong connections with auctions. Albeit noisy, this CSF allows contenders to obtain a sure win by outbidding others by a wide enough margin. On the other hand, a contender with zero impact can still enjoy a positive winning probability if the other contestants have not too large impacts. That would be the case for k in the example above if h j (x j ) < 1 : As argued by Hirshleifer (1991) this …ts well with confrontations with severe frictions such as incomplete information, fatigue or di¢ cult terrain where contenders …nd extremely costly to overpower rivals.
An …nal remark is in order here: Our Theorem 1 di¤ers from Theorem 1 in Münster (2009) in that we replace Proportional Consistency by Equalizing Consistency. This new axiom leads to the characterization of the family of di¤erence-form CSFs. Recall that Proportional and Equalizing Consistency di¤er on how contenders'winning probability in a subcontest relate to their winning probability in the grand contest. In particular, they di¤er on how to distribute -proportionally or equally-the "excess" probability 1 X
across members of the subcontest. This can explain why Corchon and Dahm (2010) …nd that the di¤erence-form CSF generates a sharing rule which co-incides with the claim-egalitarian bargaining solution whereas the ratio-form CSF coincides with the claim-proportional bargaining solution.
3 Invariance
Scale invariance
In this section, we study two other properties employed in previous axiomatic characterizations of CSFs. These properties impose the invariance of winning probabilities to certain changes in the pro…le of contestants'e¤orts. The …rst one, and most-commonly used, is homogeneity of degree zero, which we refer to here as scale invariance.
Axiom 5 (Scale Invariance
This axiom states that winning probabilities must remain constant to equiproportional changes in all contenders'e¤orts. Scale invariance implies that units of measurement of e¤ort do not matter. This is a desirable property when e¤orts are measured in money or military units (battalions, regiments, etc.). It is a property which is also satis…ed by the indices of relative inequality introduced by Atkinson (1970) .
Münster (2009) proved that if a CSF satis…es axioms A1-A3, A4'and A6, then the impact functions in the ratio-form CSF must be all homogeneous of the same degree. Let us now do the analogous axiomatization exercise in our setting and characterize the family of scale invariant di¤erence-form CSFs.
Theorem 2 If a CSF satis…es axioms A1-A5, then it satis…es (3) and the impact functions h k (x k ) are homothetic functions satisfying
where k and > 0 are parameters and the function g(x k ) : R n k + ! R + is increasing, homogeneous of degree one and satis…es g(0) = 0 and g(1) = 1.
and viceversa, so the set K does not change: Again, we denote its cardinality simply by K :
In the next step of the proof we follow a similar procedure as in the proof of Theorem 2 in Rai and Sarin (2009, p. 147). Take any two di¤erent groups k; j K . By Theorem 1, p k ( x) =p k (x) implies that their impact functions satisfy
for any x k 2 R n k + nf0g: Since the last term in the above equality is just a constant, the di¤erence h k ( x k ) h k (x k ) is the same for all k K and we can conclude that this di¤erence depends on but not on x k : Hence it must hold true that
where 1 =(1; :::; 1) is the vector of appropriate length whose components are all equal to one. Now add and substract h k (1) to the left hand side of this expression and denote H(
It can then be rewritten as
De…ne now G( ) = H( 1): This is a function of just one variable and it is increasing and continuous since by Theorem 1 we know already that h k (x k ) must be increasing and continuous. We can then rewrite
G( t) = G( ) + G(t):
This is one of the Cauchy functional equations whose only solution is given by G(z) = ln z where is an arbitrary constant (Aczél, 1966, p. 41) . This implies
and by the same token that
Given our de…nition of the function H( ); this implies that
By A5, it must be that is identical for all impact functions. Now, consider the case x k = 0: Fix x j 6 = 0 for each j 6 = k in K and 6 = 1. Because p k ( x) =p k (x) it must be that
This identity can only hold under two circumstances: First, if = 0; which in turn implies that the impact functions must be homogeneous of degree zero, i.e. h k ( x k ) = h k (x k ). But for any 6 = 1 this violates A2 since it imposes that the impact functions must be strictly increasing in their arguments when a winning probability is in the interval (0; 1). So we are left with the only other possible case, that is, lim
This is a function of one variable, which in turn must be a multiple of a power function, i.e. 
The function g k (x k ) must be homogeneous of degree one since
Finally, tracing back our steps
Given that lim x k !0 + h k (x k ) = 1 it must be that g(0) = 0: Finally, observe that it must also be that g k (1) = 1 given that
The di¤erence-form CSF has been often criticized because it seemed to necessarily violate scale-invariance (Skaperdas, 1996 To the best of our knowledge, this family of scale invariant di¤erence-form CSFs has only been studied in Polishchuk and Tonis (2013, p. 218). They microfound a CSF of the form
by using a mechanism design approach when contenders are individuals who have private information over their valuation of victory. For the case of group contests, one example of a function satisfying (7) is the function h k (x k ) = k + ln(
; which we study in more detail in Section 4.
Translation invariance
If a CSF is de…ned as a function of the di¤erence between contenders'e¤orts, another natural invariance property is the following: Winning probabilities should remain constant when the e¤ort of all contenders increase by the same amount. This is equivalent to the following property.
Axiom 6 (Translation Invariance) For all > 0 and all k 2 K;
Skaperdas (1996) and Münster (2009) used this property as an alternative to homogeneity of degree zero in their axiomatization of the ratio-form CSFs. Actually, Translation Invariance can be traced back to the income distribution literature, and in particular to the concept of absolute inequality introduced by Kolm (1976a,b) . Absolute inequality states that the level of inequality in a distribution should not vary when the income of every individual increases by the same …xed amount. Hence, any measure of absolute income inequality must be translation invariant.
However, the standard Translation Invariance axiom builds in an implicit bias against big groups. Adding a constant to the e¤ort of each member means that total group e¤ort increases by n k : Therefore, bigger groups increase their e¤ort more than smaller groups in absolute terms. But the standard Translation Invariance property implies that winning probabilities should remain invariant after that change. In order to correct this bias, we introduce the following axiom:
This property implies that if the total e¤ort increases across all groups by the same positive amount by members increasing their e¤ort by a …x amount n k , winning probabilities should remain constant. Group Translation Invariance thus levels the play…eld: It eliminates the bias against big groups implicitly built in the standard Translation Invariance property, a bias which has been so far overlooked by the literature. 8 Before stating our next theorem, consider the following de…nition:
We will refer to the scalar k as the degree of (linear) translatability of the impact function. Translatability is analogous to linear homogeneity when a …xed amount is added to the arguments of a function. We borrow this concept from the income distribution literature; it is a building block in the analysis of absolute inequality (Kolm, 1976a (Kolm, , 1976b Blackorby and Donaldson, 1980) . We are …nally ready to state our theorem characterizing the family of translation invariant di¤erence-form CSFs.
Theorem 3 If a CSF satis…es axioms A1-A4 and A6, then it satis…es (3) and the impact functions h k (x k ) are translatable of the same degree > 0. If A6 is replaced by A7, then each impact function h k (x k ) is translatable of degree n k .
Proof. A6 implies that p k (x+ 1) =p k (x) so we can use the same reasoning as in the proof of Theorem 2 to establish that K does not change. Now, combining Theorem 1 with the Translation Invariance axiom for any k; l K we obtain,
Since this holds for any l; k K , the di¤erence in impacts must depend only on so
where ( ) is a continuous function because it is equal to the di¤erence of two continuous functions. This expression holds for any > 0 so
This is just the Cauchy functional equation whose only solution is of the form ( ) = where > 0 is an arbitrary real number: The proof when A6 is replaced by A7 runs along the same lines. It must be that
where k ( ) is also continuous because it is the di¤erence of two continuous functions. Note that for this expression to hold true, it must be also that
Because this holds for any > 0 then one can write
which implies that
By induction, it is easy to see that this property implies that
This is again the Cauchy functional equation whose solution is k ( ) = k : This together with (8) implies that
so k = n k where is an arbitrary positive scalar. This completes the proof.
For an example of a translation invariant di¤erence-form CSF, consider the following impact function which we employ in a companion paper (Cubel and Sanchez-Pages, 2014):
This is the natural logarithm of a CES function with exponential e¤orts. The parameter measures the degree of complementarity of members'e¤orts. This function is linear when = 0. It violates Monotonicity when ! 1 as it converges to the weakest-link technology (Hirshleifer, 1983) . This function satis…es Translation Invariance if = 0 and Group Translation Invariance if = 1:
One remark is in order at this point: In his Theorem 3, Münster (2009) characterizes the class of ratio-form CSF which are also translation invariant. He shows that for individual contests, this class boils down to the logistic CSF introduced by Hirshleifer (1989; 1991) . In the literature, the logistic form is often referred to as a di¤erence-form CSF. At the light of our axiomatization, we see this label as a misnomer. As our Theorem 1 shows, this form does not satisfy the Equalizing Consistency axiom. Hence, in order to be precise and rigorous, we believe that the logistic form should remain classi…ed as a (translation invariant) element of the family of ratio-form CSFs.
Aggregation
So far, none of the properties we have posit on CSFs is speci…c to group contests. A distinctive feature of confrontations among groups is that members'e¤orts must be aggregated in some form. This is modelled through the impact function. Further assumptions on the aggregation of e¤orts are thus needed in order to obtain sharper characterizations. Consider the following axiom introduced by Münster (2009).
Axiom 8 (Summation) For any k 2 K consider two e¤ort vectors x k and x 0 k such that
This axiom implies that winning probabilities should remain invariant to changes in the distribution of e¤orts within groups which leave total group e¤ort unchanged. In the context of lobbying or rent-seeking, where e¤orts are monetary, such assumption seems granted. Underlying this axiom is the assumption that e¤orts within groups are perfect substitutes, so the marginal productivity of individual e¤ort does not depend on the e¤ort made by other group members.
Let us now apply this property to our characterization of the family of di¤erence-form CSFs.
Proposition 1 If a CSF satis…es axioms A1-A5 and A8, then it is of the form (3) and the impact functions h k (x k ) satisfy
where k and > 0 are parameters.
Proof. Given Theorem 2, we only need to prove that g(
By A8, we know that the impact function can be expressed just as a function of the average e¤ort of the group
This together with expression (7), implies that it is possible to write g(x k ) = (
where by Theorem 2 again, a = (1) = g(1) = 1: This leads to the functional form (9) : Note that this function g(x k ) satis…es that g(0) = 0.
The addition of Summation to our set of axioms produces a tighter characterization of the impact function. Proposition 1 highlights once more that the di¤erence-form CSF can be scale invariant when the function mapping members'e¤orts into group impact is logarithmic. This result can also respond to a criticism often made against this family of CSFs and originally raised in Hirshleifer (2000) 9 : If the di¤erence between the e¤orts of two contenders is kept …xed, the weaker side should be more likely to win as the absolute e¤orts of the contenders increase. More formally, p fk:jg k (x k ; x k + c) should be increasing in x k ; where c > 0: This property is called positive elasticity of augmentation by Hwang (2012) . It is not satis…ed in two-player contests by either the logistic ratio-form or the linear CSF introduced by Che and Gale (2000) . This is because these CSFs assume a linear mapping from e¤ort to impact, which renders these functions translation invariant, that is
for t > 0: This in turn implies that p fk:jg k (x k ; x k + c) is constant in c so the elasticity of augmentation is zero. Such feature seems indeed unreasonable in many circumstances. It is easy to see that if the di¤erence-form group CSF satis…es Scale Invariance and Summation, so the impact functions are as in (9), then for any > 1
where the last inequality follows from the Monotonicity axiom. Therefore, the weaker group has a higher winning probability as the total e¤orts of the two groups increase whilst keeping the di¤erence between total e¤orts constant; that is, the elasticity of augmentation is positive.
Let us now turn our attention to the case of translation invariant CSFs:
Proposition 2 If a CSF satis…es axioms A1-A4, A6 and A8, then it is of the form (3) and the impact functions h k (x k ) satisfy
where k and k > 0 are parameters, and k = n k for all k: If A6 is replaced by A7, then k = :
Proof. By A8, it is possible to de…ne the impact function as a function of
By Theorem 3 and A6, this function k ( ) must satisfy
Substituting n k by t shows that it must be that
where a k = H k (0) = expf k (0)g: Tracing back our steps,
If we employ A7 instead, then the function k ( ) must satisfy
Applying the same procedure, when x k = 0 it must be the case that H k ( n k ) = expf n k gH k (0); so substituting again
Summation plus Translation Invariance imply that impact functions must be linear. This has an additional consequence. Given that the form (3) is already separable in groups' impacts, any equilibrium of a contest with a translation invariant di¤erence-form function must be in dominant strategies under two sets of circumstances: 1) when contenders are risk neutral, so the interpretation of p k (x) as a share or as a winning probability are equivalent; or 2) when individual utilities are non-linear and p k (x) is a winning probability. In these two cases, the marginal bene…t of individual e¤ort does not depend on the e¤ort of any fellow group member or the e¤ort of outsiders. It is thus natural that Beviá and Corchón (2014b) microfound this type of CSFs by means of dominant strategy implementation. Dominance solvability does not apply however when utilities are non-linear and p k (x) is instead a share of the prize contested, as in Levine and Smith (1995) . 10 One potentially undesirable consequence of the Summation axiom is that the resulting CSFs can admit biases. Take for instance the linear impact in (10) for the case of two-group contests, i.e. K = 2: In that case the di¤erence-form (3) boils down to
where _ x k denotes the average e¤ort in group k: Note that group k has a headstart (handicap) whenever k > (<) l . The reason why the CSF admits this type of biases is because the Summation axiom remains silent on the relative success of di¤erent groups with the same total e¤ort. One possibility is to modify the axiom in order to account for this problem.
Axiom 9 (Total E¤ort) For any two groups k; l 2 K such that
This axiom is a stronger version of Summation; it is actually a combination of Summation and the Between-Group Anonymity axiom in Münster (2009). It requires that two groups with the same total e¤ort must have the same winning probability regardless of their size. Again, this property can make sense when e¤orts are monetary units, but not when e¤orts represent time or when group size matters. For instance, the impact of a group of 10 people demonstrating for 100 hours may not be the same as the impact of a group of 1000 people demonstrating for an hour.
The following Proposition shows that when Total E¤ort replaces Summation, the bias described above vanishes.
Proposition 3 If A8 is replaced by A9, then the impact functions characterized in Propositions 1 and 2 must satisfy k = for all k 2 K:
Proof. It su¢ ces to show that when A9 holds, impact functions, whatever their functional form, should be identical across groups. To see this note that
because A9 also applies to changes in the distribution of e¤orts within groups which maintain total e¤ort constant. Hence, for any vector x k it is possible to write the impact of the group as a function of the total e¤ort, i.e.
From this it is clear to see that k and l are identical functions since by A9 they yield the same value whenever they are applied to the same argument. Hence, impact functions (9) and (10) must not di¤er across groups and k = for all k 2 K:
Total E¤ort eliminates biases in favor of certain groups. Such biases can be desirable in some instances. For instance, when they are the result of a¢ rmative action policies aimed at fostering the participation of disadvantaged groups (Franke, 2012) . In other contests, such as when a social planner seeks to commit to a fair and impartial sharing rule (Corchon and Dahm, 2011), these biases should be removed.
A particularly interesting CSF emerges when the Total E¤ort axiom and Scale Invariance are imposed: Denote by X k the sum of e¤orts in group k and order groups by their total e¤ort in a decreasing manner. Then, the CSF characterized by Proposition 3 must be
is the geometric mean of groups'total e¤orts and K is the largest integer such that
Conclusion
In this paper, we have o¤ered the …rst systematic study of group contests where winning probabilities depend on the di¤erence between contestants' e¤ective e¤orts. Our axiomatic characterization rested on an Equalizing Consistency axiom which imposes that the di¤erence between winning probabilities in the grand contest and in the smaller contest must be identical across participants in the smaller contest. This contrasts with the consistency axiom employed in all the existing characterizations of the ratio-form CSF which posits that probabilities in any subcontest should be proportional to winning probabilities in the grand contest. One advantage of the Equalizing Consistency axiom is that it does not bound contestants to have a zero probability of winning a smaller contest when they have zero chances of winning a larger one.
The CSF resulting from our characterization generalizes the functional form introduced by Che and Gale (2000) and later employed by Rohner (2006) , Persson (2008, 2009 ) and Gartzke and Rohner (2011) . This functional form has three distinctive features: 1) Impacts across contestants are separable, 2) it awards a sure victory to a contender who overpowers its rivals by a large enough margin and 3) it allows contenders to enjoy a positive winning probability when their impact is zero provided that other contenders are not too strong.
We showed that, contrary to what it has been argued in the literature, di¤erence-form CSFs can be homogeneous of degree zero, and that they do not force di¤erences in winning probabilities to remain invariant when absolute di¤erences in raw e¤orts remain constant, i.e. a zero elasticity of augmentation. In addition, we ‡agged-up that the Translation Invariance property builds in an implicit bias against big groups which should be corrected. In this process, we also argued that the logistic function (Hirshleifer, 1989 (Hirshleifer, , 1991 , although often referred to as a di¤erence-form CSF, does not actually belong to this family. In our opinion, this label should be reserved only to CSFs satisfying the Equalizing Consistency axiom, which the logistic form does not satisfy.
In the last part of the paper, we explored one possible technology of aggregation of e¤orts within groups. This helped us to sharpen our characterization of admissible impact functions. We also showed that a modi…ed version of the Summation axiom in Münster (2009) can unbias the CSF, a desirable property in contexts where impartiality has a value.
The family of di¤erence-form CSFs has not been employed in the contest literature as often as other functional forms. We hope that, by clarifying its properties, our axiomatization can persuade researchers in the area to include this family of CSFs in their toolkit. Of course, our characterization is normative and leaves out strategic interactions. Che and Gale (2000) showed that their linear di¤erence-form CSF often leads to mixed-strategy equilibria and that any equilibrium in pure-strategies involves at most one contender exerting positive e¤ort. One possible next step would be to explore whether the equilibria of contests under the generalized di¤erence-form CSF axiomatized here still presents such features. In addition, this form implies the separability of contender groups, leading to dominant strategy equilibria when impacts are linear. We explore these issues in a companion paper (Cubel and Sanchez-Pages, 2014 ).
